排序方式: 共有15条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
This paper models the assignment of residual income claimancy to an R&D manager and applies the model to biotechnology firms. Residual income claimancy provides incentives for the manager to monitor the R&D process. Since the nature of R&D and of monitoring scientific effort is different, our model predicts stark differences in the residual income claimancy of managers and in other aspects of organization for innovative R&D firms like biotechs. In particular, R&D firms are expected to be more owner‐managed, more expert‐managed, and smaller in size. Cross‐sectional data on biotechnology firms is consistent with these implications. Additionally, longitudinal data indicate that as firms alter their focus on biotech research, their organizational structure changes as expected. Our approach suggests a process of firm and industry evolution related to technological maturity and points to the importance of incentives rather than risk sharing in determining organizational form, similar to the original analysis of franchising. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
2.
Castaneda Marco A.; Garen John; Thornton Jeremy 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2008,24(1):215-246
This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model. 相似文献
3.
4.
Timothy Fogarty Michel L. Magnan Garen Markarian Serge Bohdjalian 《Journal of Business Ethics》2009,84(2):165-187
By employing the theoretical template provided by agency theory, this article contributes a detailed clinical analysis of
a large multinational Canada-headquartered telecommunications company, Nortel. Our analysis reveals a twenty-first century
norm of usual suspects: a CEO whose compensation is well above those of his peers, a dysfunctional board of directors, acts
of income smoothing to preserve the confidence of volatile investors, and revelations of financial irregularities followed
by a downfall. In many ways, the spectacular rise and – sudden – fall of Nortel illustrates excesses of actors within, and
contradictions of the system of corporate governance implied by the agency model. Furthermore, this case illustrates limitations
of the agency framework in complex situations with short-term oriented investors. 相似文献
5.
6.
We study theoretically the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation, and we show how manipulating earnings is particularly rewarding in more competitive markets since the boost in market value of reporting good earnings is especially important. Using a panel dataset of about 70,000 observations spanning the period 1989–2011, we document that the competitive environment is an important determinant of Jones type discretionary accruals and it also affects real earnings management. In additional analysis, we find that the effect of competition on earnings manipulation is particularly important for companies that seem to be underperforming their competitors and that the competition‐earnings management linkage is moderated by the degree of information visibility at the industry level. 相似文献
7.
John Garen Mark Berger Frank Scott 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》1996,36(4):417-429
This paper analyzes firms' decisions to hire older workers. We model, the role of pensions in back-loading pay for specifically trained workers. We then evaluate the effects, of imposing age discrimination rules and non-discriminatory fringe benefit rules, and analyze the consequences for the firm's decision to hire older versus younger individuals. The model predicts that defined benefit pension plans deter the hiring of older workers, but only if hired for entry level position. The reason is f hat the wages of this group cannot be lowered enough to pay for the benefits. Data from a new survey of employers are used to test this hypothesis. The findings show that a more generous defined benefit pension plan reduces employment prospects for older, entry level workers. Employers offering defined benefit pension, plans employ older workers, but tend not to hire them into entry level jobs. 相似文献
8.
Crawford Steve Markarian Garen Muslu Volkan Price Richard 《Review of Accounting Studies》2021,26(1):218-257
Review of Accounting Studies - Research has failed to document a consistent association between oil prices and stock prices. We propose and examine whether that failure is due to the need to link... 相似文献
9.
ABSTRACTWe find that firm-level investment is negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ short-term EPS forecasts. In a 35-year panel dataset of US based companies, we find evidence that suggests firms with the best growth opportunities, opaque firms, and firms with higher than usual bonus compensation, are the ones to alter investment in order to beat benchmarks. Utilizing the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as a natural experiment we find that firms trade off accruals-based earnings management in lieu of investment cuts. Results are robust to a number of covariates, and endogeneity or reverse causality does not seem to drive our inferences. This study suggests that, consistent with survey results from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005. “The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73], managers may reduce or delay corporate investment to meet or beat short-term earnings benchmarks. 相似文献
10.